Challenges and Benefits of Standardising Early Warning Systems: A Case Study of New Zealand’s Volcanic Alert Level System by Fearnley, CJ et al.
Challenges and Benefits
of Standardising Early Warning
Systems: A Case Study
of New Zealand’s Volcanic Alert
Level System
Sally H. Potter, Bradley J. Scott, Carina J. Fearnley ,
Graham S. Leonard and Christopher E. Gregg
Abstract
Volcano early warning systems are used globally to communicate
volcano-related information to diverse stakeholders ranging from speciﬁc
user groups to the general public, or both. Within the framework of a
volcano early warning system, Volcano Alert Level (VAL) systems are
commonly used as a simple communication tool to inform society about
the status of activity at a speciﬁc volcano. Establishing a VAL system that
is effective for multiple volcanoes can be challenging, given that each
volcano has speciﬁc behavioural characteristics. New Zealand has a wide
range of volcano types and geological settings, including rhyolitic calderas
capable of very large eruptions (>500 km3) and frequent unrest episodes,
explosive andesitic stratovolcanoes, and effusive basaltic eruptions at both
caldera and volcanic ﬁeld settings. There is also a range in eruption
frequency, requiring the VAL system to be used for both frequently active
‘open-vent’ volcanoes, and reawakening ‘closed-vent’ volcanoes. Fur-
thermore, New Zealand’s volcanoes are situated in a variety of risk
settings ranging from the Auckland Volcanic Field, which lies beneath a
city of 1.4 million people; to Mt. Ruapehu, the location of popular ski
ﬁelds that are occasionally impacted by ballistics and lahars, and produces
tephra that falls in distant cities. These wide-ranging characteristics and
their impact on society provide opportunities to learn from New Zealand’s
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experience with VAL systems, and the adoption of a standardised single
VAL system for all of New Zealand’s volcanoes following a review in
2014. This chapter outlines the results of qualitative research conducted in
2010–2014 with key stakeholders and scientists, including from the
volcano observatory at GNS Science, to ensure that the resulting
standardised VAL system is an effective communication tool. A number
of difﬁculties were faced in revising the VAL system so that it remains
effective for all of the volcanic settings that exist in New Zealand. If
warning products are standardised too much, end-user decision making
and action can be limited when unusual situations occur, e.g., there may
be loss of speciﬁc relevance in the alert message. Speciﬁc
decision-making should be based on more speciﬁc parameters than the
VAL alone, however wider VAL system standardisation can increase
credibility, a known requirement for effective warning, by ensuring that
warning sources are clear, trusted and widely understood. With a credible
source, user groups are less likely to look for alternatives or conﬁrmation,
leading to faster action. Here we consider volcanic warnings within the
wider concept of end-to-end multi-hazard early warning systems including
detection, evaluation, notiﬁcation, decision-making and action elements
(based on Carsell et al. 2004).
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1 Early Warning Systems
and Standardisation
An Early Warning System (EWS) can be deﬁned
as a system designed to provide “hazard moni-
toring, forecasting and prediction, disaster risk
assessment, communication and preparedness
activities, systems and processes that enables
individuals, communities, governments, busi-
nesses and others to take timely action to reduce
disaster risks in advance of hazardous events”
(UN 2003). They are recognized as “a means of
getting information about an impending emer-
gency, communicating that information to those
that need it, and facilitating good decisions and
timely response by people in danger” (Mileti and
Sorensen 1990, p. 2–1). Essentially EWSs facil-
itate the provision of timely warnings to mini-
mize loss of life and to reduce economic and
social impact on vulnerable populations (Garcia
and Fearnley 2012).
The operation of an EWS presents numerous
challenges due to variations in: scale (global,
national, regional, local); temporality (rapid
onset, slow onset, frequent, infrequent); function
(safety, property, environment); and hazard (e.g.,
weather, climate, geohazards). A Volcano Alert
Level (VAL) system is a communication tool
within a volcano EWS, which simpliﬁes the
communication of volcanologists’ interpretation
of data (Newhall 2000). The VAL system is
disseminated with supporting information that
provides more speciﬁc details and local context
to enable responding agencies, the public, and
other stakeholders to make informed decisions
(Fearnley 2011; Potter et al. 2014). The levels
can be labelled using words, numbers, colours,
and/or symbols, and summarise information from
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‘background’ activity (no unrest), through to the
highest level of activity (usually a large eruption)
(Newhall 2000; Fearnley 2011).
Volcano observatories play a key role in the
management and assignment of alert levels for
volcanoes. However, with over 80 volcano
observatories around the world, it is under-
standable that VAL systems operate in very dif-
ferent ways. Some provide only scientiﬁc advice
on what a volcano is doing, others forecast
activity, and others provide guidance on what
vulnerable populations should do. There is a
growing discussion globally around the role of
VAL systems and whether they should be stan-
dardised, either nationally and/or internationally.
In 1989, the member states of the United
Nations declared the period from 1990 to the
year 2000 to be the International Decade for
Natural Disaster Reduction (IDNDR) to focus
attention on reducing loss of life, and social and
economic disruption caused by natural disasters.
Of fundamental importance was the recognition
in 1991 of early warnings as a key objective of
disaster reduction practices (Maskrey 1997). The
United Nations has called for more effective
procedures via standardisation and the applica-
tion of new technologies and enhanced scientiﬁc
understanding (United Nations 2006) but few
hazards have an EWS operating beyond a
national or regional scale. The most successful
example is the Paciﬁc Tsunami Warning Centre
(PTWC), established in Hawaii in 1949. Until
recently, PTWC provided Warning and Watch
alert level services for numerous Paciﬁc nations
and beyond, but currently they provide nations
with threat level information (e.g., wave ampli-
tude forecasts), which the countries then use
in-house to develop and disseminate speciﬁc
tsunami alert levels (i.e., Warning, Watch).
The growing pressure on volcano observato-
ries to standardise warnings is felt especially in
relation to provision of advice and alert levels to
the aviation sector. In 2006, the International
Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO) globally
standardised a considerable portion of products,
including the alert levels (via the Aviation Col-
our Code (ACC); Table 1), messages to airlines
that observatories are expected to provide (via
the Volcano Observatory Notice for Aviation;
VONA), and the framework for monitoring and
alerting related to ash clouds (via the Volcanic
Ash Advisory Centres; VAACs). While VAACs
provide the aviation community with information
regarding where ash currently is in the air, the
role of the ACC is more about warning (Gardner
and Guffanti 2006). The ACC allows a recogni-
tion of the level of volcano activity for the pur-
pose of attention by the aviation industry, and to
inform their decisions, such as regarding
re-routing or extra fuel (Gardner and Guffanti
2006). VONAs are standardised plain-English
messages aimed at dispatchers, pilots, and
air-trafﬁc controllers ‘produced by Volcano
Observatory scientists and are based on analysis
of data from monitoring networks, direct obser-
vations, and satellite sensors’ (as described on
the USGS website1). The international nature of
these aviation products reflects the need for avi-
ation personnel to ascertain the status of volcanic
activity across a number of countries and VAL
systems (e.g., Guffanti and Miller 2013), which
is why a standardised approach is used. While
working ﬁne for international air trafﬁc, problems
have been encountered for low-level domestic
and private aviation with the ACC (Fearnley
2011).
Numerous volcano observatories across the
world are now implementing the ACC, and many
of these are questioning the adoption of other
VAL systems for ground-based hazards and
reviewing their volcano early warning systems.
This includes reviewing the effectiveness of VAL
issuances, as Winson et al. (2014, p. 12) invite
“countries to perform their own self-evaluation
and weigh the cost of a higher number of alerts
against the beneﬁt of a higher accuracy in VAL
issuances and to decide how to proceed accord-
ingly with their own local populations”.
The beneﬁts of standardisation are principally:
• simplicity through application of common
language, frameworks and understanding;
• clarity for emergency responders;
1https://volcanoes.usgs.gov/vhp/notiﬁcations.html accessed
11 May 2017.
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• reduced workload for monitoring and emer-
gency management agencies, including edu-
cation and outreach;
• interoperability of equipment and systems
across hazards, and across agencies, countries
or internationally.
Warning messages with speciﬁc language and
approaches can beneﬁt from standardisation. In
doing so, it is advisable to publish and make
accessible the deﬁnitions of technical volcanic
terms, and of the words ‘risk’ and ‘hazard’ as
used by the scientists. This is to ensure local
users understand the intention behind the scien-
tist’s use of the terms. For example, calculation
of ‘hazard’ can be based on previous events,
deterministic and/or probabilistic approaches,
and should be described. In addition, the com-
munication of likelihood/probability can also be
a point of confusion; ideally numeric values
should be mapped against qualitative descrip-
tions and both presented together (e.g., Doyle
and Potter 2016). Standardisation can also
increase credibility, a known requirement for
effective warning, by producing warnings that
are clear, and from a trusted source. With a
credible source user groups are less likely to look
for alternatives or conﬁrmation, leading to faster
action. However, end-user decision making and
action can be limited in terms of
contingent-speciﬁc-needs if warning products are
standardised too much (e.g., depending on a
user’s ability to read different types of maps
(Haynes et al. 2007); or loss of meaning or rel-
evance in the warning within a local context).
There are various elements of end-to-end
warnings that lend themselves to standardisa-
tion that can aid the effectiveness of the VAL
system:
• Technical: Equipment type, deployment
(distribution/location/density), telemetry (ra-
dio, wire, internet etc.), visualization (soft-
ware packages) and analysis all receive some
level of standardisation through manufactur-
ing standards, detection limits, and interna-
tional scientiﬁc best practice.
• Analytical tools: Analysis may be further
structured through statistical approaches such
as expert elicitation, Bayesian event trees or
Bayesian belief networks.
• Warning tools: Notiﬁcation may be stan-
dardised through message content (e.g.,
standard messages, terminology, alert level
criteria), packaging (e.g., bulletins, alert
levels, maps) and delivery channels (e.g.,
phone, internet, siren). Some standards lend
interoperability, such as a Common Alerting
Protocol.
• Response: Decision-making and action by the
end-user can be standardised to some extent
through communication and education
approaches and message content.
Clearly there are cases where standardisation
provides many advantages, but the process of
standardisation is predominantly triggered and
shaped by social, political, and economic factors,
rather than in response to scientiﬁc needs speciﬁc
to a region. Standardisation, by deﬁnition, tends
to exclude the importance of incorporating local
factors into a global procedure. Hence, even if
standardisation may yield improved strategies for
gathering and interpreting warning signals, it will
still favour inflexible procedures not designed to
accommodate local social and cultural con-
straints. Challenges are brought about by a range
of issues (Fearnley 2011, 2013), especially:
• the realities of varied volcanic systems, each
being geophysically unique when examined
in detail. The diversity and uncertain nature
of numerous hazards that can occur at dif-
ferent temporal and spatial scales require
speciﬁc EWSs to be developed.
• varied end-users with different needs and
perspectives for their decision-making, in
terms of the level of volcanic activity, and
timing thresholds for response actions.
• multiple local social and cultural contexts and
constraints, which presents challenges in
relation to the applicability and responsive-
ness of EWSs to local knowledge and
context.
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In recent decades, standardisation within VAL
systems at a national level has taken place,
making provision for consistency of warnings
enacted by civil authorities that are required to
take action and facilitate national policies for
emergency management. VAL systems in a
number of countries (including Japan via the
Japan Meteorological Agency (JMA), Vanuatu
via GeoHazards, the USA via the USGS, and
New Zealand via GNS Science) have been
standardised in each country for use by all vol-
canic observatories. Yet, there are variances in
the way VAL systems are being standardised. In
the USA, for example, two standardised VAL
systems are now in place: a textually based ver-
sion for ground hazards (e.g., watch, warning)
and the aviation colour code that uses colours as
labels. In New Zealand, the VAL systems
adopted in 1994 and reviewed in 1995 also used
two standardised VAL systems: one designed for
hazards expected at frequently active volcanoes
and the other for restless and reawakening vol-
canoes (see Table 2). Both of the New
Zealand VAL systems were numerically based
using six levels ranging from 0 to 5 (Scott and
Travers 2009). Another review in 2014 resulted
in these two systems being combined into one
(Potter et al. 2014), whilst also adopting the
international aviation colour code (ACC). Nota-
bly, both the USA and New Zealand VAL sys-
tems are based upon the current activity of a
volcano, and neither advocate action nor provide
advice to users involved in crisis management
and mitigation—this information is provided in
other products. In sharp contrast, the
Japanese VAL system addresses the measures to
be taken for speciﬁc areas of danger, indicating
extent of evacuation, and outlining the expected
volcanic activity.2
This chapter focuses on the standardisation of
VAL systems using the case study of New
Zealand in the revision of the VAL system in
2014, to explore the beneﬁts and challenges in
implementing a nationally standardised VAL
system. Reflections upon its success will help
inform others as to why the devised national alert
level in New Zealand is best placed for their
nation, and why perhaps an international level of
standardisation for VAL systems is still some-
thing that is unadvisable, and unfeasible.
1.1 Overview of New Zealand’s
Volcanic Risk Setting
New Zealand straddles the boundary between the
Paciﬁc Plate and the Australian Plate. The
resulting subduction zone lies beneath a rifting
area of thin crust with magmatic upwelling,
called the Taupo Volcanic Zone (TVZ; Fig. 1).
The TVZ contains most of New Zealand’s active
volcanoes, and includes stratovolcanoes and
calderas.
New Zealand has a range of volcanic risk
settings that creates a challenge in effectively
communicating scientiﬁc information to stake-
holders, including the public. In terms of hazard,
the volcanoes have large differences in the
potential eruption styles and magnitudes of
eruptions, reflected by variations in magma
chemistry. The past frequency of eruptions and
the date of the most recent eruption also vary
considerably between them, which contributes
towards a range in the likelihood element of the
risk equation. The exposure and vulnerability of
communities to unrest and eruptions also differs,
with some volcanoes (such as Ruapehu, Ngau-
ruhoe, and Tongariro) situated in a largely
unpopulated National Park; and others are
islands in the Paciﬁc Ocean with few permanent
residents (such as Raoul Island in the Ker-
madecs). Other volcanoes, such as Auckland
Volcanic Field, Taupo Volcanic Centre, Okataina
Volcanic Centre and Rotorua Caldera volcano,
are in close proximity to cities. A few of the
volcanoes receive tens of thousands of visitors
each year, and are used commercially by tourist
operators (including Whakaari/White Island).
Others, such as Taranaki volcano, are surrounded
by fertile agricultural land and are near important
national infrastructure. Each of these elements of
risk (hazard characteristics, likelihood, exposure
and vulnerability) influence the type of
2www.data.jma.go.jp/svd/vois/data/tokyo/STOCK/kaisetsu/
English/level.html accessed on 11 May 2017.
Challenges and Benefits of Standardising Early … 5
Fig. 1 Map of New Zealand’s volcanoes, from Potter
(2014), and based on Smith et al. (1993), Nairn (2002),
Wilson et al. (2009), and Lindsay et al. (2010). The Taupo
Volcanic Zone (TVZ; depicted as a dashed line) envelops
the majority of the volcanoes. The calderas (polygons) are
MI Mayor Island; Ro Rotorua; OVC Okataina Volcanic
Centre; Kp Kapenga; Rp Reporoa; Oh Ohakuri; Mg
Mangakino; Wh Whakamaru; and TVC Taupo Volcanic
Centre. The volcanic ﬁelds are indicated by ovals with
diagonal lines
6 S.H. Potter et al.
communication and information required, as the
local context needs to be considered.
The Tongariro Volcanic Centre is the south-
ernmost volcanic complex of the TVZ, and
includes the frequently active andesitic Ruapehu
and Ngauruhoe/Tongariro stratovolcanoes.
Lahars have frequently occurred, causing a haz-
ard in numerous valleys on the volcanoes (e.g.,
Leonard et al. 2008). Ruapehu hosts popular ski
areas, and last erupted with vigour in 1995–96
(Hurst and McGinty 1999). Small eruptions with
short durations also occurred in October 2006
and September 2007. Volcanic unrest is
on-going. Ngauruhoe is the most frequently
active vent of the Tongariro massif, displaying
regular eruptions until 1977 (Scott 1978), but
none since. Te Maari Crater and Red Crater on
northern Tongariro were active in the late 19th
Century, with frequent eruptions in 1896–97
(Scott and Potter 2014). After less than one
month of minor unrest, Te Maari Crater was the
source of two small, short-lived phreatic erup-
tions on 6 August and 21 November 2012
(Fig. 2). There were no casualties, however the
tourism industry was impacted due to the closure
of a popular walking track (the Tongariro Alpine
Crossing) by the Department of Conservation
(DoC), which manages the National Park.
There are eight areas of known caldera col-
lapse in the central TVZ (Fig. 1), which itself can
be considered to be a caldera system similar to
Yellowstone in the USA. Although calderas are
usually formed in occasional very large erup-
tions, their magma system can also be the source
of many smaller eruptions. The calderas in the
TVZ have erupted almost exclusively rhyolitic
material in at least 25 caldera-forming eruptions
in the last 1.6 million years (Wilson et al. 1984,
2009). Only <0.1% of the volume of deposits in
all of the TVZ are from basaltic eruptions
(Wilson et al. 1995). The caldera volcanoes have
a large range in past eruption magnitudes. For
example, the TVZ’s most-recent caldera collapse
took place at Taupo Volcanic Centre (TVC) in
232 ± 5 AD, erupting 35 km3 of magma
(Wilson 1993; Davy and Caldwell 1998; Self
2006; Hogg et al. 2012). This devastated a sig-
niﬁcant portion of the central North Island in
widespread pyroclastic density currents (Wilson
and Walker 1985). However, 26 of the 29 erup-
tions at TVC in the past 26,000 years (since the
last supervolcano eruption) have been much
smaller than the most recent eruption (Wilson
et al. 2009). Therefore, it is unknown whether
future eruptions at TVC will be relatively
small, as has been the case most frequently, or
Fig. 2 Eruption at Te Maari
Crater, Tongariro, on 21
November 2012, captured by
the GeoNet Te Maari Crater
web camera (GNS Science)
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devastatingly large, as was the case with the most
recent eruption. An additional challenge is
managing caldera unrest, which can cause social
and economic impacts, without a resulting
eruption (Potter et al. 2012, 2015).
The north-eastern extremity of the TVZ
contains White Island (Whakaari), a privately
owned andesitic stratovolcano located 50 km
from the Bay of Plenty coastline. It is currently
New Zealand’s most frequently active volcano,
and a popular tourist destination with approxi-
mately 25,000 tourists and tourist operators
visiting the island per year. Frequent eruptive
sequences have been documented since written
records began in 1826 (Nairn et al. 1991), with
the most recent eruptions occurring in 2016.
New Zealand is also responsible for a number
of other island volcanoes, including Mayor
Island in the Bay of Plenty, and Raoul and
Macauley Calderas in the Kermadec Island
chain, 750–1000 km northeast of New Zealand.
These islands have very few visitors or resi-
dents. About 30 submarine volcanoes are also
known in the Kermadec area and some exhibit
eruptive activity. Due to the lack of monitoring
data, a VAL is not allocated to them.
Taranaki Volcano is a stratovolcano located in
the west of the North Island, outside of the TVZ.
It is thought to have last erupted in 1755 AD
(Druce 1966), but it may have subsequently
extruded lava, forming a dome after this date
(Platz 2007). It is capable of fairly large erup-
tions, and has a history of sector collapse (e.g.,
Neall 2003). Taranaki Volcano is surrounded by
productive agricultural land and is in a major
hydrocarbon (gas and oil) production region.
There is a regional population of just over
100,000 people, most of whom live in the city of
New Plymouth.
The intraplate Puhipuhi-Whangarei Volcanic
Field (PWVF), the Kaikohe-Bay of Islands
Volcanic Field (KBOIVF) and Auckland Vol-
canic Field (AVF) are in northern New Zealand
(Fig. 1). PWVF is thought to have been active as
recently as 0.26 Ma, while dating of the
KBOIVF indicates an eruption occurred at about
0.05 Ma (Smith et al. 1993), or perhaps as
recently as in 200–500 AD (Kear and Thompson
1964). AVF has had many eruptions from at least
53 basaltic vents, most recently about 600 years
ago (e.g., Needham et al. 2011). Auckland city
hosts a third of New Zealand’s population with
1.4 million residents, and is sited directly on top
of AVF.
Eruptions from most of New Zealand’s vol-
canoes are likely to impact infrastructure of
national importance, including many State
Highways and road networks, electricity lines
and power stations, train lines, water supplies,
and sewage facilities (Wilson et al. 2012).
Additionally, industries important to the local,
regional, and national economies may be threat-
ened during future eruptions, including the
tourism, agricultural, forestry, and hydrocarbon
industries.
1.2 Communication of Volcano-
Related Information
in New Zealand
In New Zealand, GNS Science is the agency
appointed by the Government to provide scien-
tiﬁc advice to local, regional, and central gov-
ernment organisations for geological hazards,
as stated in the Guide to the National Civil
Defence Emergency Management (CDEM)
Plan (MCDEM 2015a) and a Memorandum
of Understanding with the Ministry of Civil
Defence and Emergency Management
(MCDEM)(GNS Science, The Ministry of Civil
Defence and Emergency Management 2015).
The MOU outlines the obligations of GNS Sci-
ence for geohazard warnings, whereas the Guide
to the CDEM Plan is to assist New Zealand
agencies to achieve the objectives of the
National CDEM Plan (MCDEM 2015b). New
Zealand’s volcanoes are today monitored by
GNS Science through the GeoNet project (Scott
and Travers 2009), funded primarily by the New
Zealand Earthquake Commission (EQC).
Volcano-related information is communicated
to stakeholders, including the public, in a variety
of formats before, during, and after volcanic
crises. The primary tool used is the Volcano
Alert Bulletin (VAB), supported by web page
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information on GeoNet News,3 blogs, news
items and social media tools (Facebook, twitter).
Volcano hazard and status information is also
presented by scientists during meetings, confer-
ences, workshops, and public lectures; websites;
in scientiﬁc and non-scientiﬁc publications; and
via the media. Smartphone app push alerts,
emails, faxes, pager alerts, and text messages
provide one-way information to registered
end-users during crises or changes in volcanic
activity. Volcanic ash impact posters (a product
of the Volcanic Impact Study Group, commis-
sioned by the Auckland Lifelines Group) provide
accessible information for critical infrastructure
stakeholders (Wilson et al. 2014). Social media
and ‘ask an expert’ interactive online sessions
allow questions to be asked by the public and
answered by scientists in real-time. Informal
conversations during meetings, workshops, or by
telephone provide end-users with more speciﬁc
information from volcanologists, with the
opportunity for two-way communication. An
example of this is during Volcanic Advisory
Group meetings, which are attended by key
stakeholders and volcanologists to discuss vol-
cano- and response-related information (Doyle
et al. 2011). Long-term hazard maps have been
created for some of the more active volcanoes,
based on geological evidence of past eruptions
(Neall and Alloway 1996; Scott and Nairn 1998).
Event-speciﬁc hazard maps are created during
unrest depending on the situation, likely vent
location, and the style and magnitude of the
potential eruption, etc. Event-speciﬁc hazard
maps were created prior to and after the Ton-
gariro eruption in 2012 (Leonard et al. 2014).
New Zealand’s VAAC, based at the Meteo-
rological Service of New Zealand Ltd. (MetSer-
vice) ofﬁce in Wellington, is designated by the
International Airways Volcano Watch system to
communicate ash information for a large section
of the southwest Paciﬁc, including New Zeal-
and’s active volcanoes (Lechner 2012). MetSer-
vice issues Volcanic Ash Advisories in a text and
graphic form, and disseminates a Signiﬁcant
Meteorological Information (SIGMET) message,
while Airways Corporation issue Notice to Air-
men (NOTAM), which draws attention to vol-
canic ash hazards within the NZ VAAC area.
These globally standardised messages are also
issued when New Zealand’s VAL changes,
prompting restrictions to local air space. After
consultation with GNS Science for NZ volca-
noes, Volcanic Ash Advisories are communi-
cated by the VAAC to MCDEM, in addition to
being provided to international aviation agencies
and meteorological communities (MCDEM
2015a). Volcanic Ash Advisories from MetSer-
vice forecast the distribution of volcanic ash in
the atmosphere for the purpose of aviation safety,
whereas GNS Science issues ashfall prediction
maps as a VAB, relating to the distribution and
thickness of tephra deposits at ground level. In
addition to these systems, GNS Science issues
Volcano Observatory Notices for Aviation
(VONA) to the VAAC to report on ground-based
volcanic activity whenever they change the
Aviation Colour Code (ACC; Table 1).
The ACC is used by the Civil Aviation Authority
of New Zealand to alert the aviation industry to
changes in the status of volcanoes within the
designated coverage area (Lechner 2012).
1.3 New Zealand’s Past VAL Systems
In New Zealand, scientists at GNS Science deter-
mine the VAL as mandated in the Guide to the
National CDEM Plan (MCDEM 2015a), with
consideration of monitoring data and using their
experience and knowledge. When decisions need
to be made rapidly (e.g., if an eruption has taken
place), the Volcano Duty Ofﬁcer can make the
VAL decision alone. GNS Science, through
GeoNet, communicates this information to
MCDEM using Volcanic Alert Bulletins.
MCDEM forwards this information on to local
authorities and CDEM Groups through the
National Warning System. GNS Science also dis-
seminates this information to other agencies, the
public, and the media (Scott and Travers 2009).
New Zealand’s ﬁrst VAL system (known as
the ‘Scientiﬁc Alert Level’ or SAL table;
3GeoNet News web page can be found at: http://info.
geonet.org.nz/.
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Table 2) was introduced in 1994. It was designed
by local volcanologists, and included descrip-
tions for different levels of activity for several
types of volcanoes, sometimes within a single
level of the table. For example, some levels
included descriptions for both unrest and erup-
tions. Later this was to cause confusion as people
were not sure which description the assigned
VAL referred to.
Several teething issues (including media
scrutiny) arose during volcanic unrest at Mt.
Ruapehu in late 1994, in part due to the
conflicting deﬁnitions causing confusion. The
original SAL system was therefore reviewed, and
a signiﬁcantly revised and amended version was
adopted in September 1995, just one week before
the 1995–96 Mt. Ruapehu eruption episode star-
ted. The resulting system (Table 3), renamed as
the VAL system in 2008, was divided into two
separate sections, one for frequently active vol-
canoes, and the other for reawakening volcanoes.
In addition to a level for ‘background activity’
(VAL 0), the frequently active volcanoes system
included one level for unrest (VAL 1) and four
levels of increasing magnitudes of eruption (VAL
2–5), whereas the reawakening volcanoes system
included two levels for unrest (VAL 1 and 2) and
three eruption levels (VAL 3–5). The VAL sys-
tem was used until it was again revised in 2014.
The division of the VAL system based on
eruptive activity was deemed to be beneﬁcial
during the creation of this system because the
outcome of unrest was perceived to be more
uncertain for reawakening volcanoes than fre-
quently active volcanoes due to no eruptions
being witnessed (except for the 1886 eruption at
Okataina). Similarly, calderas (which were pre-
dominantly in the reawakening volcanoes group)
were seen as more likely to exhibit unrest with-
out resulting in an eruption than stratovolcanoes.
Many scientists have the perception that
end-users, who are more familiar with strato-
volcano eruptions, think unrest will predomi-
nantly result in an eruption (Potter 2014). Thus,
by separating reawakening volcanoes from fre-
quently active volcanoes, it is implied that the
volcanoes behave differently, and that unrest at
reawakening volcanoes may not result in an
eruption. An additional level of heightened
unrest was inserted into the reawakening system
to help reinforce this meaning.
2 Reviewing New Zealand’s VAL
Systems
While the VAL system that was developed in
1995 performed well for ﬁfteen years, it under-
went an exploratory review between 2010 and
2014 to ensure it was the best system possible.
Potter et al. (2014) used a qualitative ethnographic
methodology consisting of interviews, observa-
tions and document analysis to investigate the
VAL system, with the involvement of both sci-
entist and end-user groups. For further details on
the methodology and full results of this research,
refer to Potter et al. (2014) and Potter (2014).
Based on the results of this research, the VAL
system was revised (Fig. 3) and implemented in
collaboration with MCDEM on 1 July 2014.
2.1 Standardising Multiple Systems
into One for All Volcanoes
Many of the research participants identiﬁed the
division between frequently active volcanoes and
reawakening volcanoes in the 1995–2014 VAL
system as a concern (Potter 2014). It was
recognised that the use of two systems:
• Complicated a system that was intended to be
a simple communication tool.
• May cause confusion in the future if two
volcanoes exhibiting different levels of sur-
face activity were allocated the same VAL
system.
• May cause confusion because as reawakening
volcanoes become more active they may
switch sides to become frequently active (and
vice versa). This was the case in 2006 when
an eruption occurred at Raoul Island.
It was undeﬁned whether the volcanoes were
grouped according to the time since the last
eruption and/or the recurrence rate of eruptions.
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Other criteria for grouping volcanoes were also
considered. Options identiﬁed included grouping
volcanoes by their:
• Type (such as volcanic ﬁelds vs. calderas vs.
stratovolcanoes)
• Potential size of eruption (however even the
most explosive volcanoes predominantly
have small eruption sizes)
• Tectonic setting (intraplate vs. subduction zone)
• Typical risk from an eruption (e.g., Auckland
Volcanic Field vs. Raoul Island)
Table 2 Scientiﬁc Alert Level table introduced in 1994 (sourced from Annexe C from the CDEM Plan)
Scientiﬁc
Level
Phenomena Observed Scientiﬁc Interpretation
1 Abnormal seismic, hydrothermal or other signatures Initial sign of volcano reawakening.
No eruption imminent.
Possible minor activity
2 Increase in seismic, hydrothermal and other unrest
indicators. Increase from usual background weak
eruptions
Indicators of intrusion process or signiﬁcant
change in on-going eruptive activity
3 Relatively high and increasing unrest shown by all
indicators.
Commencement of minor eruptive activity at
reawakening vent(s) or increased vigour of on-going
activity
If increasing trends continue there is a real
possibility of hazardous eruptive activity
4 Rapid acceleration of unrest indicators. Established
magmatic activity at reawakening vents or signiﬁcant
change to on-going activity
Hazardous volcanic eruption is now
imminent
5 Hazardous volcanic eruption in progress Destruction within the Permanent Danger
Zone (red zone) and signiﬁcant risk over
wider areas




Status of activity of volcano
Green Volcano is in normal, non-eruptive state
Or, after a change from a higher alert level:
Volcanic activity considered to have ceased, and volcano reverted to its normal, non-eruptive
state
Yellow Volcano is experiencing signs of elevated unrest above known background levels
Or, after a change from a higher alert level:
Volcanic activity has decreased signiﬁcantly but continues to be closely monitored for possible
renewed increase
Orange Volcano is exhibiting heightened unrest with increased likelihood of eruption. Or, volcanic
eruption is underway with no or minor ash emission [specify ash-plume height if possible]
Red Eruption is forecasted to be imminent with signiﬁcant emission of ash into the atmosphere likely
Or, eruption is underway with signiﬁcant emission of ash into the atmosphere [specify ash-
plume height if possible]
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• Geographical region (or existing Volcanic
Advisory Group).
One VAL system for each volcano was also
considered, with the perceived beneﬁt of being
locally appropriate. However, this would result
in at least 15 systems in New Zealand, most of
which require a response by the same group of
stakeholders and scientists due to the relatively
small population size and land area, and having
only one volcano observatory (at GNS Science
near the township of Taupo). It is more likely
that having multiple systems in this situation will
lead to confusion and mismanagement than in a
larger country where separate groups of people
are responding to the same, familiar volcano over
time. Many participants speciﬁcally stated that
they would not want the over-complication of
having too many VAL systems.
The division of volcanoes into separate VAL
systems should be considered very carefully. The
need for the VAL system to be used as a simple
communication tool very likely outweighs any
beneﬁts of multiple tailored and more detailed
Table 3 New Zealand’s VALS used between 1995 and 2014. Reproduced from the MCDEM (2006) Guide to the
National CDEM Plan, prior to its 2014 revision
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VAL system. For these reasons, the revised VAL
system was designed to be used for all of New
Zealand’s volcanoes, regardless of factors such
as the type, setting, frequency of eruptions, or
typical eruption style.
The foundation of the VAL system was also
explored in order to determine how the level of
volcanic activity could best be communicated
(Potter et al. 2014). The 1995–2014 VAL system
was based on the severity of the volcano phe-
nomena (e.g., magnitude of eruption); it ranged
from ‘background activity’ to ‘large hazardous
eruption’. The perceived beneﬁts of this foun-
dation included:
(a) Scientists were most knowledgeable and
“comfortable” in determining the severity of
phenomena, as opposed to considering other
elements of risk. This would lead to less
uncertainty and shorter warning times.
(b) The severity of phenomena was seen as the
ﬁrst step in communication, and as being
more relevant for a wider range of stake-
holders. Interpretation and forecasting infor-
mation can subsequently be tailored to
various audiences, environments, and situa-
tions in other communication products.
Various other foundations were considered,
including: the level of hazard (taking into
account the geological and recent eruptive his-
tory of a volcano and spatial extent of hazards,
but not the exposure and vulnerability of popu-
lations); volcano processes and state of the
underlying magma system (ranging from ‘no
magma’ to ‘large extrusion of magma’); the level
Fig. 3 New Zealand’s
revised VAL system, which
was implemented on 1 July
2014. Source Sect. 19 of the
Guide to the National CDEM
Plan (MCDEM 2015a)
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of risk (taking into account the severity of the
hazard as well as the exposure and vulnerability
of populations); or a combination of factors (e.g.,
focussing on the phenomena during unrest and
then on the spatial extent of hazards during
eruptions). Research participants were asked for
their preference of these options; scientists pre-
ferred the phenomena-based system, while
stakeholders were more evenly spread but had a
slight preference for a combined foundation.
They also suggested other types of VAL systems,
particularly retaining a phenomena-based system
that also included hazard information. As stated
by a stakeholder in the CDEM sector:
The phenomenon-based system helps me under-
stand what is going on and the relative severity of
the event. The hazard-based system sets out clearly
what needs to be done as a consequence. In terms
of my CDEM responsibilities, we need both—
people get twitchy about instructions given with-
out context and justiﬁcation.
During the ﬁnal feedback process, this phe-
nomena foundation system accompanied by
hazard information was found to be useful and
acceptable for all of New Zealand’s volcanoes in
their varied risk environments.
2.1.1 Other Considerations When
Standardising the VAL
System
Very careful consideration was given to all
words in the VAL system (Fig. 3) by its devel-
opers (Potter 2014; Potter et al. 2014). Not only
did it need to be effective during escalation,
de-escalation and static levels of volcanic activ-
ity, it also needed to be appropriate for the wide
range of volcano types and settings in New
Zealand. For example, the term ‘vent’ was used
in VAL 3 in the hazard column instead of ‘crater’
because some volcanoes have very large craters
(e.g., Taupo), or an eruption may occur from a
vent on a volcano flank. The use of ‘vent’, ‘near
volcano’ and ‘beyond volcano’ is part of the
introduction of a dimensionless nomenclature to
the VAL system.
No eruption forecasting language was included
in the VAL system (beyond ‘potential for eruption
hazards’ in VAL 2), because the capabilities and
experience of the volcanologists in forecasting at
each of New Zealand’s volcanoes is unequal. The
use of each phenomena-based alert level would be
restricted by the associated description of the
expected future activity, which at some of New
Zealand’s volcanoes, will be very uncertain. For
example, if statements such as ‘eruption expected
within the next two weeks’ were included in VAL
2, volcanologists would not be able to commu-
nicate that a volcano was showing heightened
levels of unrest unless they also thought that an
eruption was expected within the next two weeks.
Forecasting information speciﬁc to each volcano
is instead included in supplementary information,
particularly Volcanic Alert Bulletins (VABs).
Because the VAL system needs to be stan-
dardised for use at multiple volcanoes, the word-
ing needed to be very simple. Therefore, terms
such as ‘minor’, ‘moderate’ and ‘major’ volcanic
eruption needed to be deﬁned in order for scien-
tists to use the system consistently between vol-
canoes, between each other when voting on the
VAL, and over time. A GNS Science guideline
document has been drafted for this purpose with
examples of typical activity shown at each VAL
by various volcanoes. This approach was taken
rather than describing monitoring criteria thresh-
olds (e.g., rate of earthquakes or rate of defor-
mation), to ensure the system can be used for
every volcano regardless of its setting, and to give
the scientists more flexibility. A GNS Science
YouTube video4 was developed to help commu-
nicate the typical levels of activity for each of the
VAL systems to the public and stakeholders.
3 Lessons Learnt from the NZ
Case Study in Relation
to the Standardisation
of VAL System
When considering whether to utilise a standard-
ised warning approach, Potter et al. (2014)
explored the purpose of the VAL system, the
information needs of New Zealand’s
4www.youtube.com/watch?v=WeZxW2xyam0&list=UUTL_
U_K1eP4T885-JL3rVgw, accessed on 11 May 2017.
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stakeholders, and the capabilities of the volcano
monitoring system. They paid particular attention
to the beneﬁts and challenges of combining
warning systems for all of the volcanoes into
one. This included determining the foundation of
the VAL system, the words used in the table,
whether forecasting language should be included,
and how the system was going to be used con-
sistently over time and at multiple volcanoes. As
identiﬁed by the IDNDR Early Warning Pro-
gramme Convenors (1997), locally appropriate
communication methods should be established
for the distribution of warnings. The social sci-
ence research used for this investigation was a
robust process that enabled the revision of the
VAL system to be based on evidence, as advo-
cated by Leonard and Potter (2015). The result-
ing VAL system has been used for all of New
Zealand’s volcanoes since June 2014. It has
worked satisfactorily to date. For example, vol-
canic unrest or eruptions with which the revised
system has been successfully used have included:
unrest at Ngauruhoe (VAL raised to 1 and later
lowered); decrease in unrest at Te Maari (VAL
lowered to 0); and small eruptions at White
Island (VAL raised to 3 and lowered later).
Volcanologists at GNS Science have found the
simple descriptions in the revised VAL table
beneﬁcial for allowing flexible decision-making
when determining the level of activity. Having
just one system for all NZ volcanoes has also
improved clarity. Regular evaluations of this
warning tool will take place in the future,
involving stakeholders, volcanologists, and the
public. There is more monitoring data and
interpretation relevant to end-users and decisions
than the VAL itself and in New Zealand such
information is included in the accompanying
VAB. Based on the recent experiences with
review and implementation of New Zealand’s
VAL systems, we strongly recommend stake-
holders consider exactly what parameters,
impacts, uncertainties and lead-times are impor-
tant to each decision that needs to be made (e.g.,
evacuation) and not simply tie responses to
changes in the VAL.
The revised VAL system has been developed
for the New Zealand context, including our
volcanic settings and risk environments, the roles
and responsibilities of our agencies, and our
social and cultural environments including the
centralised nature of our volcano monitoring and
warning system. As such, it is unlikely that it is
able to be directly copied for other countries.
However, the process that we followed can be
used, as summarised in the next section.
4 Recommendations for Reviewing
or Developing a VAL System
This chapter has focussed on aspects relating to
standardisation, when reviewing a VAL system.
There are other considerations to take into
account as well. We describe below our recom-
mended processes and considerations when
reviewing a VAL system (or developing a new
one), based on our research and experience.
(1) Understand the context
It is vital to understand the physical, cultural,
social, organisational and historical context of the
VAL and related systems. Potter et al. (2014)
found that using the qualitative methodology of
ethnography allowed a deep understanding of the
culture of the volcanologists to be built to address
many of the following factors. However, we
recognise that this is a time-consuming process
that is not an option for many observatories
looking to revise their VAL systems. If this is the
case, then drawing on published material, attend-
ing volcano monitoring meetings, and holding
discussions with those familiar with the various
environments should be sufﬁcient. We recommend
understanding as much as possible about the:
• Range of potential volcanic activity at every
volcano that the VAL system may be used
for, including frequency of eruptions, level of
ongoing unrest or eruptions, potential mag-
nitude of eruptions (and unrest phenomena),
and severity of all possible hazards.
• Volcano monitoring system to understand
capabilities and factors such as timing,
uncertainties and content of incoming data.
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• Level of exposure and vulnerability of ele-
ments at risk to volcanic hazards, including
the built, social, economic and natural
environments.
• Roles and responsibilities, including legisla-
tive requirements, of scientiﬁc advisors from
all institutions, and organisations with the role
of planning, education, response and recovery
from volcanic events (including governmen-
tal and civil defence agencies, infrastructure/
lifelines, emergency services, health,
agricultural/horticultural and business sec-
tors). For example, understand which agen-
cies have the responsibility to communicate
directly to the public.
• Influences on the VAL decision-making pro-
cess. This includes understanding the cultures
of people/groups determining the VAL sys-
tem, and the receivers of the information
including decision-makers and stakeholders,
and the public. For example, influences on the
VAL decision-making process may include
experience, external pressure, peer pressure
and other social psychology biases, internal
voting guidelines, how individuals interpret
the content and structure of the VAL system,
and the desire to maintain credibility or con-
duct ﬁeldwork (Potter 2014). Factors such as
these contributed towards the design of the
revised NZ VAL system. Additionally,
understanding the way stakeholders read
volcano-related information and use it in their
decision-making contributed towards deter-
mining what information was included in the
NZ VAL system, how it is communicated to
them.
• Previous VAL systems, and any other exist-
ing alerting systems for volcanic or other
hazards used in the country or for the volcano
in question. What were people’s experiences
with those systems? What worked well or
didn’t work well? Are there any other warn-
ing systems being used on or near the vol-
cano, including the international ACC?
Understanding VAL systems that have been
implemented in other parts of the world is
also useful. Being familiar with the chal-
lenges and beneﬁts of standardisation as
outlined in this chapter is relevant for this
point.
• What other communication avenues exist for
related information from all agencies? For
example, Volcanic Alert Bulletins, phone
calls, meetings, websites, emails, social
media. These provide the context of whether
the VAL system will need to include all
important information as a standalone system,
or if it can be supported by other channels.
(2) Understand the challenges and beneﬁts of the
existing VAL system
It is important to know who the audience is
for the VAL system, and what they use it for. If
the system is targeted at stakeholders and
decision-makers, perhaps more technical and
speciﬁc information could be included than if the
audience includes the public. This information
might also inform the position of the divisions
between alert levels by matching it to their
decision-making needs. However, due to the
wide range of stakeholder needs and the differing
points at which they need to take action, coupled
with a system that communicates to multiple
audiences, it is likely that discussions will need
to be held to encourage stakeholders to determine
their own decision points, rather than them
relying on changes in alert levels. Understand
their perception of the purpose of the VAL sys-
tem, and their experiences with any existing
VAL systems, through methods such as inter-
views, open-ended questions in surveys, or
workshops/focus groups. Ask the volcanologists
(or whomever determines the VAL) what they
ﬁnd useful or challenging, and see if their per-
ceived purpose of the system matches that of the
stakeholders/public. Analyse the existing system
to identify jargon, unclear meanings, and the
foundation of the system. Understand what
channels are used to communicate it (such as
websites, social media, Bulletins), as this may
pose opportunities or limitations in designing a
revised system. Ask all parties what they would
like to see in a revised system. Determine factors
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such as whether it should include eruption fore-
casting messages, what its foundation should be
based on, and whether it is a standardised system
for multiple volcanoes, or speciﬁc to a single
volcano.
(3) Produce a draft version of the revised VAL
system and seek feedback
By considering the context, and collating the
information outlined in step 2, recommendations
for a revised system can be developed. Based on
those recommendations, a draft version (or
multiple options) can be developed. Both the
summarised ﬁndings and the draft(s) can then be
circulated back to participants to ensure their
perceptions and needs have been accurately
captured. For the NZ revision, Potter (2014)
asked participants to rank ﬁve draft versions,
which helped to determine the most appropriate
foundation and structure of the revised VAL
system. Multiple iterations then occurred to
produce the ﬁnal version. Do not underestimate
the amount of time needed for this process! A
ﬁnal version of the VAL system can now be
developed (consider utilising graphics
specialists).
(4) Release revised system in collaboration with
stakeholders
In conjunction with key stakeholders, deter-
mine a date on which the new system will be
used, taking into account the length of time all
parties need to update documentation, websites,
etc. Release communications to circulate the
change in VAL system through the media,
stakeholder newsletters, meetings, etc. In NZ,
GNS Science developed a media release six
weeks prior to the start date of the system, and on
the day of the changeover, with support from
MCDEM. Make a plan for if a new eruptive
episode should start close to the changeover date
(thankfully no eruptions occurred for the chan-
geover date in NZ!). Write any supporting doc-
umentation or procedures, such as a guideline for
consistent use by the volcanologists, or whether
the VAL system will be used exactly as written
or more flexibly.
(5) Evaluate the revised VAL System
Conduct regular evaluations to ensure the
revised (or new) VAL system is effective, and
meeting the needs of stakeholders, the public,
and volcanologists. Real events and exercises can
be used.
5 Volcanic Crisis Communication
Warnings about natural hazard events are com-
municated in order to minimise losses (Newhall
2000). However, trust and communication net-
works must already be in place prior to a crisis
for effective planning and response. This can be
achieved by developing networks, ascertaining
information needs and establishing methods of
effective communication (Paton et al. 1998).
VAL systems are just one aspect of an EWS, and
by design are the simplest tool to communicate
the status of the volcano (or level of response
required, etc.). Due to this overarching purpose,
standardising VAL systems can help ensure a
consistent, simple, and understandable design.
As we have outlined in this chapter however,
there are issues with using a one-size-ﬁts-all
communication product. This was also identiﬁed
by Thompson et al. (2015) in using probabilistic
volcanic hazard maps. We found that taking into
account the local context is vital, which supports
the ﬁndings of numerous recent research in vol-
canic crisis communication (Haynes et al. 2007;
Fearnley et al. 2012; Potter et al. 2014). Pro-
viding supporting information using other means
helps to alleviate these issues.
Over the past two decades, social science has
increasingly played a valuable role in mitigating
volcanic risks by providing evidence-based links
between communities, stakeholders and scien-
tists (Barclay et al. 2008; Leonard and Potter
2015). We recommend that in the future these
robust methodologies are embraced by volcano
observatories, such as when revising
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communication strategies and products, to help
effectively share information and reduce the risk
to society.
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